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RESTITUTION-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
I. SERVICES RENDERED

II. RESCISSION

III. LEGAL COMPULSION

"A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other." This is the first
section of the Restatement of Restitution.' It indicates the principle
underlying a field of the law co-ordinate with tort and contract.
About a dozen cases during the survey period may be classified as
raising a problem within this general subject. They do not cover
the whole range of the field and have here been classified on a pragmatic rather than an analytical basis.
I. SERVICES RENDERED

Services are normally rendered under a contract which governs the
nature of the services and the compensation to be given. This contract may be expressed, or it may be implied from the conduct of
the parties, in which case some of the details of the contract may not
have been spelled out. The services may also have been bestowed on
a party gratuitously, with no intent to charge for them. But cases
arise where there was no binding contract between the parties and
the services should not be treated as a gift. In such circumstances
the recipient may be held under a duty to make restitution. Four
cases present the question of whether such a duty was raised.
In Cotton v. Robert's Estate,2 a nephew resided with his family on
his aunt's farm, on a crop-sharing basis. During her lifetime, the
nephew and his family rendered various personal services (e.g., driving an automobile, running errands, milking cows, tending sheep),
and on her death, when he received less in her will than he anticipated
he filed a claim against her estate. The court of appeals affirmed a
dismissal of the claim. The court found no indication that the nephew
had ever intended to charge for the services or that the aunt had
expected to be charged for them, and it adverted to the well established "presumption" that "services are rendered gratuitously, from
*Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar;
author, Cases and Materials on Restitution (1958).
1. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).

2. 337 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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motives of affection and duty," when they are performed
ber of a family on behalf of another member of the same
was the conclusion of the court that claimant had rendered
in the hope that his aunt would provide for him in her
followed the uniform rule that one who bestows benefits
an expectation cannot sue for the value of the benefit
4
disappointed.
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will, and it
under such
when he is

In Jennings v. Davidson County,5 one Mosley had long been an
inmate of the Davidson County Hospital as a pauper. Shortly before
her death she came into possession of an estate, and the county
claimed for the value of the services rendered. Early cases almost
uniformly held that a governmental agency or other person who
bestowed services on a supposed pauper could not recover for their
value unless there was fraud involved. The holding was that the
services were given gratuitously, and the fact that this was under a
mistake was held to make no difference. 6 A number of recent cases
have regarded the mistake as controlling and have allowed recoveryJ
Tennessee adopted this doctrine many years ago.8 The instant case
extends this position by holding that the decedent's estate is liable
for services rendered even if the decedent was in fact a pauper. The
reason given is that the services were never really gratuitous, since
they were ordered by law. "The patient at all times owed for the
services."9 The court also held that the county was performing a
governmental function in rendering the services, so that the six-year
statute of limitations did not apply.
In Woodard v. Bruce,10 where a trust deed and note given for home
improvements were cancelled for fraud and sharp dealing, it was held
that the contractor was entitled to the value of his services in making
3. Id. at 780. For an extensive collection of cases on these presumptions,
see Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 8 (1949).
4. There are many cases to this effect. The rule goes back to the early English decision of Osborn v. Governors of Guy's Hospital, 2 Strange 728, 93
Eng. Rep. 812 (K.B. 1727); see also Brown v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19, 122 Atl.
169 (1923). The subject is treated in RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 57 (1937).
Illustration 1 under this section reads as follows: "A supports B, his aunt,
for a number of years, indicating that he is doing so from a feeling of
moral obligation for the family. He anticipates, although he does not so
manifest, that his aunt will leave him her estate. B leaves her estate to
charity. A is not entitled to receive compensation for his services."
5. 344 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. 1961).
6. E.g., Chariton County v. Hartman, 190 Mo. 71, 88 S.W. 617 (1905);
Chester v. Underhill, 16 N.H. 6 (1844).
7. E.g., Old Men's Home, Inc. v. Lee's Estate, 191 Miss. 669, 4 So. 2d 235
(1941); Conkling's Estate v. Champlin, 93 Okla. 79, 141 P.2d 569 (1943).
8. McNairy County v. McCoin, 101 Tenn. 74, 45 S.W. 1070 (1898).
9. 344 S.W.2d at 361. Many states have statutes affecting the municipality's
right of recovery. See generally Annots., 125 A.L.R. 712 (1940), 29 A.L.R.2d
732 (1953).
10. 339 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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repairs on the home of complainant, "on a quantum meruit basis."
In Nunnery v. Nunnery" an attorney was held to be entitled to a
reasonable fee for services rendered. He had been employed to
arrange for the interpretation of a will and the partition and sale of
certain real property. A designated fee was set for the first parcels of
land. Later, while work on the case was proceeding, the attorney was
discharged and other lawyers employed. When the litigation was
finally completed and the sale took place, the attorney was held to be
entitled to a reasonable percentage of the value of the property involved, and the value of the property was determined as of the time
of the sale (it had increased greatly in value), rather than at the
time the contract was initially entered into.
II. REscissioN

A rescission of a voidable or apparently valid contract is often
granted in order to prevent unjust enrichment. This year's cases
illustrate some of the reasons why this is done. One of the most common reasons is fraud, as in the case of Woodard v. Bruce. 2 There,
an elderly colored woman "of very poor mentality," having been
notified by the city that she must make repairs on her home, was
induced by defendants to enter into a contract for repairs at an
excessive price and to give a note and deed of trust for payment at a
rate much higher than she had any probability of paying. The court
of appeals approved the holding of the chancellor below-that while
mere inadequacy of consideration in itself may not be sufficient
to grant relief unless very extreme, the situation is different when
the accompanying incidents are inequitable. "In this case we have
a contract made for insufficient consideration by a person of weak
mind in necessitous circumstances. This amounts to constructive
fraud."' 3 The defendants included not just the contractor but the
person who had made the loan and the subsequent purchaser of the
note. The former was held to have been a party to the original
fraudulent conduct and the latter either to have known about it or
to have intentionally and wilfully remained ignorant of it. The de14
fense of bona fide purchase for value was therefore held inapplicable.
A second case in which relief was granted from fraudulent conduct
is Williams v. Burmeister.15 Like the Woodard case it arose in Memphis and involved a money lender and real estate dealer. The dell. 335 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
12. 339 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960). See text to note 10 supra.
13. Id. at 149.
14. See RESTATEmENT, REsT IoN § 174 (1937) (treating notice).
15. 338 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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fendant here had engaged in a devious course of conduct to take
advantage of a plaintiff in a necessitous condition due to an adverse
judgment and impending sale of his real property. Defendant's scheme
involved a "John Doe letter," a warranty deed, a lease-purchase
agreement, a note and deed of trust and other instruments. "These
several instruments were designed to confuse and deceive [plaintiff]
into believing that he was actually saving his building though it
would take him thirteen to fifteen years before it would be clear of
debt. From the beginning [defendant] had by the provisions of
forfeiture in the lease contract, what card players sometime call a
'lead pipe cinch' to declare the lease purchase contract forfeited at
anytime he . . .thought it propitious so to do and thus become the
legal owner of the entire fee in the property [worth more than
$30,000] at a total consideration of approximately $20,000.216
The court held the defendant to be a constructive trustee, declared
the warranty deed to be a mortgage, purged the transaction of all
usury and granted other relief. Judge Carney's opinions in the two
cases indicate that the court will be alert to detect "sharp practices"
17
and to utilize its powers to protect the victims of such schemes.
In Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Jackson,18 rescission was
granted of certain insurance policies. The insured had epilepsy, and
his answers in the application might have been treated as misrepresentations, but the court found this unnecessary since the policies
had a "good health clause" providing that the company's liability
should be "limited to the return of premiums if the Insured was not
in sound health on the date of issuance and delivery of this Policy."
The clause was held not to be waived, and the company was relieved
of liability upon payment of the premiums.
Chance v. Geldreich'9 is another case where the relief granted
amounted to a rescission. Complainant conveyed certain property
to defendants so that they could obtain a G.I. loan on it for her. Having done so, they conveyed it back to her, but she failed to record
the deed. Subsequently they conveyed to another defendant, who
knew of the transaction. This case involved a bill to remove the last
deed as a cloud on title, and the relief was granted, despite the contention (and the holding in the lower court) that complainant should
be denied relief because of unclean hands.20 Defendants, however,
16. Id. at 654.
17. See generally, RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 166 (1937).
18. 342 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
19. 337 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
20. The argument is essentially that the parties were in pari delicto, but
the court held that the grantee of the deed sought to be removed was not a
party to the G.I. loan transaction, and added that there was no real indication
of illegality or fraud on anyone in that transaction, since the lender was
fully aware of the details.
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were allowed equitable liens for amounts expended on the property.
In Post Sign Co. v. Jemc's, Inc.,21 a receiver of a corporation sought
to have the sole shareholder's note declared "tainted with usury and
unjust enrichment" and purged of the usury. The relief was denied
on the ground that the note was that of the shareholder, not the
corporation, and the corporate entity could not be ignored.
In Harwell Motor Co. v. Cunningham, 2 a complainant who had
purchased an automobile while a minor was permitted to rescind the
transaction two years later when he became of age, and to recover his
money back. "[I]t is the law that a minor can disaffirm a disadvantageous contract not for necessaries upon the attainment of his majority.
..
."23 The court found that complainant had not fraudulently misrepresented his age and had not affirmed or ratified the contract after
coming of age.
III. LEGAL COMPULSION
In Jack Cole Co. v. MacFarland,24 complainant paid a privilege
tax under protest and sued for recovery. The tax was held to be an
income tax, not authorized by the state constitution and therefore
unconstitutional and void. Recovery was allowed under a code provision,25 but the principle on which the statute is based is the restitutionary principle that a payment made under coercion may be
recovered back if it was not due.26 In a similar suit the tax was held
to be due, and recovery was not allowed. 27
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

342 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
337 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
Id. at 769.
337 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. 1960).
TENN. CoDE ANN. § 67-2305 (1956).
See RESTATEwmNT, RESTnrUTiox § 75 (1937) (void taxes and assessments).
General Tel. Co. v. Boyd, 343 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn. 1960).

